In Ruling Passions, Simon Blackburn contends that we should reject sensibility theory because it serves to support a conservative complacency. Blackburn's strategy is attractive in that it seeks to win this metaethical dispute – which ultimately stems from a deep disagreement over antireductionism – on the basis of an uncontroversial normative consideration. Therefore, Blackburn seems to offer an easy solution to an apparently intractable debate. We will show, however, that Blackburn's argument against sensibility theory does not succeed; it is no (...) more supportive of conservative complacency than Blackburn's noncognitivism. A victory for noncognitivism cannot be so easily won. (shrink)

We initially characterize what we’ll call existence problems as problems where there is evidence that a putative entity exists and this evidence is not easily dismissed; however, the evidence is not adequate to justify the claim that the entity exists, and in particular the entity hasn’t been detected. The putative entity is elusive. We then offer a strategy for determining whether an existence problem is philosophical or scientific. According to this strategy (1) existence problems are characterized in terms of causal (...) roles, and (2) these problems are categorized as scientific or philosophical on the basis of the epistemic context of putative realizers. We argue that the first step of the strategy is necessary to avoid begging the question with regard to categorization of existence problems, and the second step categorizes existence problems on the basis of a distinction between two ways in which an entity can be elusive. This distinction between kinds of elusiveness takes as background a standard account of inference to the best explanation. Applying this strategy, we argue that the existence of a multiverse is a scientific problem. (shrink)

This book contains new essays in honor of Melvin J. Lerner, a pioneer in the psychological study of justice. The contributors to this volume are internationally renowned scholars from psychology, business, and law. They examine the role of justice motivation in a wide variety of contexts, including workplace violence, affirmative action programs, helping or harming innocent victims and how people react to their own fate. Contributors explore fundamental issues such as whether people's interest in justice is motivated by self-interest or (...) a genuine concern for the welfare of others, when and why people feel a need to punish transgressors, how a concern for justice emerges during the development of societies and individuals, and the relation of justice motivation to moral motivation. How an understanding of justice motivation can contribute to the amelioration of major social problems is also examined. (shrink)

V.H. Dudman has argued that a better semantic account of the conditional emerges from placing grammar ‘in the driver's seat’. His account of their grammar identifies two main categories, which differ from those postulated by traditional theorists, and which he claims correspond to two very different and deep‐rooted styles of thought. I show that it is unlikely that a perfect match exists between styles of thought and grammatical categories in the way that Dudman postulates. I consider arguments by Dale (...) and Edgington in this context. More importantly, however, I also show that even if there were a perfect match, Dudman's account would still obscure semantic similarities between ‘if’‐sentences which are arguably of greater importance than the ones he highlights. This, I suggest, has implications extending far beyond Dudman's work. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 12.2 (2007) 125-127MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Whither Environmental Philosophy?Dale JamiesonBy most reasonable standards, environmental philosophy has been an enormous success since its beginnings in the 1970s. Courses in the subject are now taught around the world, there are many opportunities for publishing, there are two dedicated graduate programs, and there are even some jobs in the field.Yet these marks of success mask some problems. (...) Environmental philosophy is fragmented along many dimensions and there are no widely shared standards of competence. The available jobs often go to surprising candidates whose skills and interests are extremely diverse. Too much publication appears in "specialist" journals, unnoticed by anyone but other contributors. Unconstructive debates, often reminiscent in tone, substance, and rancor of the old and new left, linger. In light of all this, I am no longer surprised when I meet people active in environmental studies and causes who claim to be environmental ethicists but who are almost entirely ignorant of the academic field that bears the name.It is well known that the environment suffers because it is not a well-bounded domain (like the economy, for example), but is rather multi-dimensional and implicated in almost every area of human choice and action. This problem is reproduced in environmental philosophy, [End Page 125] which impinges on many fields, disciplines, and areas of inquiry, but is still struggling to find its own boundaries and identity.One of the core challenges for environmental philosophy is to understand its audience and to whom it is responsible. Historically, the field grew out of the discipline of philosophy, but many who consider themselves environmental philosophers are hostile to the discipline as it is currently practiced. They don't read the journals, go to the conferences, or try very hard to integrate their concerns into the discipline as a whole. Another possible home for environmental philosophy is environmental studies which is a self-consciously interdisciplinary field. Trouble is, environmental studies has many of the same problems as environmental philosophy without even a home discipline to secede from or rebel against. It also carries the added burden of delivering a respectable major to large numbers of eager, but often intellectually impatient, undergraduates. Perhaps one day environmental philosophy will be absorbed into an expanded field of bioethics, which increasingly sees itself as concerned not only with medicine, but with health, a concept that many believe applies broadly across the biosphere.Some put their faith in "public philosophy" or the "policy turn." I can hardly object. When pluralism, pragmatism and inherent value were all the rage in environmental philosophy, I was writing about climate change, zoos, and preserving urban landmarks. Yet it must be acknowledged that with the exception of Peter Singer (whom many would not consider an environmental philosopher), those who have touched the public most deeply in recent years have largely been writing about traditional philosophical concerns rather than about applied, practical, or interdisciplinary problems. Some examples: Paul Boghossian's critique of relativism was favorably reviewed in much of the popular press, including The Wall Street Journal. Anthony Appiah's Cosmopolitanism won the Arthur Ross Book Award from the highly influential Council on Foreign Relations. Books on free will and the philosophy of religion are everywhere; Daniel Dennett has almost become a household name. Most strikingly of all is Harry Frankfurt's On Bullshit, originally a critique of deconstruction delivered to a Yale seminar in the 1980s, which beginning in 2005 spent 26 weeks on the New York Times best seller list. It's enough to make you wonder what relevance is and whether it's really relevant.What is to be done? For fear of sounding like a third-rate marriage [End Page 126] counselor, the field needs communication and good will. These are the necessary building blocks for constructing a common sense of identity. The signs are encouraging but equivocal. The June conference in Colorado, now entering its fifth year, has been an important forum for communication, as has the International Society for Environmental Ethics meetings held in conjunction with the divisional meetings of... (shrink)

Thomas Hurka’s recursive account of value appeals to certain intuitions to expand the class of intrinsic values, placing concepts of virtue and desert within the realm of second and third order intrinsic goods, respectively. This is a formalization of a tradition of thought extending back to Aristotle and Kant via the British moralists, G. E. Moore, and W. D. Ross. However, the evidential status of such intuitions vis a vis the real, intrinsic value of virtue and desert is hostage (...) to alternative explanations. If there is a plausible competing explanation for these intuitions, then the (putative) fact that desert and virtue are intrinsic (rather than instrumental or derivative) goods seems a much less obvious choice for the best explanation. As it turns out, there are plausible evolutionary explanations for these intuitions about desert and virtue. These evolutionary explanations suggest that it is adaptive to value desert and virtue separately from their instrumentality for other goods. Consequently, these explanations debunk intuitions about the intrinsic value of desert and virtue. (shrink)

Academic integrity policies at 200 institutions of higher education were examined for the presence of academic prohibitions against the nonmedical use of prescription stimulants or any other cognitive enhancing drug. Researchers used online search tools to locate policy handbooks in a stratified random sample of IHE’s drawn from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System database, searching for NMUPS/CED use as violations of either academic integrity or alcohol and other drug policies. Of 191 academic integrity policies found online, NMUPS/CED prohibitions were (...) present in only one. However, NMUPS was addressed in all but two of the 200 IHE AOD policies, often with language referencing IHE adherence to federal or state law. NMUPS/CED prohibitions are predominantly absent in IHE academic integrity policies, raising questions about whether colleges and universities are concerned about the use of enhancement drugs as a form of cheating. Implications for fairness, health promotion, and future research are discussed. (shrink)

Quine argues, in “On the Nature of Moral Values” that a coherence theory of truth is the “lot of ethics”. In this paper, I do a bit of work from within Quinean theory. Specifically, I explore precisely what a coherence theory of truth in ethics might look like and what it might imply for the study of normative value theory generally. The first section of the paper is dedicated to the exposition of a formally correct coherence truth predicate, the possibility (...) of which has been the subject of some skepticism. In the final two sections of the paper, I claim that a coherence theory in ethics does not reduce the practice of moral inquiry to absurdity, in practice as well as in principle. (shrink)

This paper considers a pair of mutually puzzling first-order intuitions: a case in which it seems both supererogatory for an agent to perform a specified act, and also seems as though were that act not performed, this would have been a failure of moral obligations. I argue that these intuitive reactions are difficult to dislodge and resist accommodation by standard accounts of supererogation. I then argue that this puzzle motivates a new form of supererogatory action: action that, though morally required, (...) is responding to moral circumstances or facts that the ordinary upright agent would typically overlook. (shrink)

Artificial general intelligence is a greatly anticipated technology with non-trivial existential risks, defined as machine intelligence with competence as great/greater than humans. To date, social scientists have dedicated little effort to the ethics of AGI or AGI researchers. This paper employs inductive discourse analysis of the academic literature of two intellectual groups writing on the ethics of AGI—applied and/or ‘basic’ scientific disciplines henceforth referred to as technicians (e.g., computer science, electrical engineering, physics), and philosophy-adjacent disciplines henceforth referred to as PADs (...) (e.g., philosophy, theology, anthropology). These groups agree that AGI ethics is fundamentally about mitigating existential risk. They highlight our moral obligation to future generations, demonstrate the ethical importance of better understanding consciousness, and endorse a hybrid of deontological/utilitarian normative ethics. Technicians favor technocratic AGI governance, embrace the project of ‘solving’ moral realism, and are more deontologically inclined than PADs. PADs support a democratic approach to AGI governance, are more skeptical of deontology, consider current AGI predictions as fundamentally imprecise, and are wary of using AGI for moral fact-finding. (shrink)

In recent decades, cognitive and behavioral scientists have learned a great deal about how people think and behave. On the most general level, there is a basic consensus that many judgments, including ethical judgments, are made by intuitive, even unconscious, impulses. This basic insight has opened the door to a wide variety of more particular studies that investigate how judgments are influenced by group identity, self-conception, emotions, perceptions of risk, and many other factors. When these forms of research engage ethical (...) issues, they are sometimes called empirical ethics. This essay argues that the field of religious ethics would benefit from a more robust engagement with empirical ethics than it has thus far undertaken. In doing so, it offers a brief account of how issues of moral psychology and moral anthropology have been treated in religious ethics, and it highlights ways that the scientific findings challenge some prevailing norms in religious ethics. It ends by suggesting avenues by which religious ethics research could productively engage empirical ethics. (shrink)

This book presents an historical and conceptual reconstruction of the theories developed by Meinong and a group of philosophers and experimental psychologists in Graz at the turn of the 19th century. Adhering closely to original texts, the contributors explore Meinong's roots in the school of Brentano, complex theories such as the theory of intentional reference and direct reference, and ways of developing philosophy which are closely bound up with the sciences, particularly psychology. Providing a faithful reconstruction of both Meinong's contributions (...) to science and the school that arose from his thought, this book shows how the theories of the Graz school raise the possibility of engaging in the scientific metaphysics and ontology that for so long have been considered off limits. (shrink)

We consider the potential contribution of economics to an interdisciplinary research partnership between sociology and neuroscience. We correct a misunderstanding in previous literature over the understanding of humans as ‘social animals’, which has in turn led to misidentification of the potential relevance of game theory and the economics of networks to the social neuroscience project. Specifically, it has been suggested that these can be used to model mindreading. We argue that mindreading is at best a derivative and special basis for (...) social coordination, whereas the general and pervasive phenomenon on which it depends is mindshaping. We then outline the foundations of Conditional Game Theory as a mathematical model of mindshaping, which extends game theory without displacing its classic solution concepts, and which exploits economists’ experience in modeling networks. (shrink)

The authors, on the basis of brief arguments, have dismissed tensor networks as a viable response to Jackendoff's challenges. However, there are reasons to believe that connectionist approaches descended from tensor networks are actually very well suited to answering Jackendoff's challenges. I rebut their arguments for dismissing tensor networks and briefly compare the approaches.

This paper examines tracer techniques in neuroscience, which are used to identify neural connections in the brain and nervous system. These connections capture a type of “structural connectivity” that is expected to inform our understanding of the functional nature of these tissues. This is due to the fact that neural connectivity constrains the flow of signal propagation, which is a type of causal process in neurons. This work explores how tracers are used to identify causal information, what standards they are (...) expected to meet, the forms of causal information they provide, and how an analysis of these techniques contributes to the philosophical literature, in particular, the literature on mark transmission and mechanistic accounts of causation. (shrink)

Sacrifice haunts the Phaedo. In this article, I argue that the mise-en-scène of the death scene of the Phaedo, as well as other sacrificial elements in the background of the dialogue, creates a nexus that positively integrates the birth, philosophical practice, and death of Socrates into the ritualized rhythm of the life of the city of Athens. A close reading of the death scene presented as a synopsis with Walter Burkert’s well-known analysis of Greek sacrifice reveals convergences and divergences between (...) the Phaedo and Greek sacrificial practice. Socrates appears as a willing victim who accepts the city’s sacrificial practice while remaining on his own terms. (shrink)

Using a result of Gurevich and Lewis on the word problem for finite semigroups, we give short proofs that the following theories are hereditarily undecidable: (1) finite graphs of vertex-degree at most 3; (2) finite nonvoid sets with two distinguished permutations; (3) finite-dimensional vector spaces over a finite field with two distinguished endomorphisms.

This is a general account of metavaluations and their applications, which can be seen as an alternative to standard model-theoretic methodology. They work best for what are called metacomplete logics, which include the contraction-less relevant logics, with possible additions of Conjunctive Syllogism, & →.A→C, and the irrelevant, A→.B→A, these including the logic MC of meaning containment which is arguably a good entailment logic. Indeed, metavaluations focus on the formula-inductive properties of theorems of entailment form A→B, splintering into two types, M1- (...) and M2-, according to key properties of negated entailment theorems. Metavaluations have an inductive presentation and thus have some of the advantages that model theory does, but they represent proof rather than truth and thus represent proof-theoretic properties, such as the priming property, if ├ A $\vee$ B then ├ A or ├ B, and the negated-entailment properties, not-├ ∼ and ├ ∼ iff ├ A and ├ ∼ B. Topics to be covered are their impact on naive set theory and paradox solution, and also Peano arithmetic and Godel’s First and Second Theorems. Interesting to note here is that the familiar M1- and M2-metacomplete logics can be used to solve the set-theoretic paradoxes and, by inference, the Liar Paradox and key semantic paradoxes. For M1-logics, in particular, the final metavaluation that is used to prove the simple consistency is far simpler than its correspondent in the model-theoretic proof in that it consists of a limit point of a single transfinite sequence rather than that of a transfinite sequence of such limit points, as occurs in the model-theoretic approach. Additionally, it can be shown that Peano Arithmetic is simply consistent, using metavaluations that constitute finitary methods. Both of these results use specific metavaluational properties that have no correspondents in standard model theory and thus it would be highly unlikely that such model theory could prove these results in their final forms. (shrink)

Dans ce texte de 1936, inédit en français, le théoricien du droit danois Alf Ross rend compte de la parution de la première édition de la Théorie pure du droit de Hans Kelsen. C'est l'occasion pour lui de souligner à la fois tout ce que la théorie du droit moderne doit au normativisme, mais aussi les profondes différences de conception dans le camp positiviste entre la conception idéelle des normes de Kelsen et le programme empiriste dont se réclament les (...) réalistes scandinaves, dans la lignée d'Hägerström. Antérieur aux grands écrits accessibles de Ross, qui vont marquer un tournant vers le positivisme logique, ce texte constitue un témoignage important pour la compréhension du débat réalisme-normativisme. (shrink)

This interview with Bernard Stiegler’s long-time translator and collaborator, Daniel Ross, examines the connections between different periods of Stiegler’s work, thought, writing and activism. Moving from the three volumes of Technics and Time to the final large-scale collaborative project of The Internation, the discussion concentrates on Stiegler’s conceptualization of ‘protentionality’, hope and care for a world confronted by climate crises, entropy and computational economic reconfigurations of work, economy and imaginations for futural possibilities. The interview foreshadows the special issue on (...) The Internation project planned by Bishop and Stiegler for TCS that will appear in the near future. (shrink)

Most commentators have focused on ethical dilemmas and the idea that they were core to the actions of and decisions by Jewish doctors in SS concentration camps and ghettos during the Holocaust. While I recognize Jewish doctors did face ethical dilemmas, in this article, I shift my attention to include two other significant factors: choiceless choices, defined by the eminent Holocaust historian Lawrence Langer as “crucial decisions [that] did not reflect options between life and death, but between one form of (...) abnormal response and another, both imposed by a situation that was in no way of the victim’s own choosing,” and the human condition, whereby decisions and actions were triggered by personal traits and past experiences in response to particular situations and circumstances. Inherent in all three factors is the tenaciousness of reality and how the abhorrent conditions, immorality, inhumanity and evilness cast a shadow over every moment of the Jewish doctor’s life. My thesis is that decision-making was not one-dimensional but multi-dimensional. For the Jewish doctor every incident became a source of dread and tragedy. They were often not trained to treat some diseases or perform surgery and lacked experience to work in such conditions and cope emotionally and psychologically. I will attempt to show that how a person responds to an ethical dilemma is based on his or her own experiences and reasoning, and how they reacted to sudden and inexplicable incidents that threatened life or impacted survival induced abnormal actions and decisions. As Jewish doctors they were driven to be healers, to be normal, but they were forced by circumstances to kill or become perpetrators, acting abnormally. Tragically the abnormal became the norm. The Jewish doctors were professionally trained and culturally socialized to continue their roles as doctors. Nevertheless, they were human and were driven by the innate will to live. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Current literature in moral and political philosophy is rife with discussion of adaptive preferences. This is no accident: while preferences are generally thought to play an important role in a number of normative domains, adaptive preferences seem exceptions to this general rule—they seem problematic in a way that preference-respecting theories of these domains cannot adequately capture. Thus, adaptive preferences are often taken to be theoretically explanatory: a reason for adjusting our theories of the relevant normative domains. However, as I shall (...) argue here, the relentless focus on the phenomenon of preference adaptation is a mistake. While I do not take a stand on whether typical examples of adaptive preferences are or are not problematic, I argue here that if they are problematic, it cannot be because they are adaptive. (shrink)

This paper attempts a rational reconstruction of the Humean notion of an ideal critic. Claiming that the traits of practice and comparison can only arise through the gradual accumulation of experience, I argue that Humean critics are real, not ideal. After discussing the nature of perfection and the relation of delicacy to the other Human traits, I propose two supplements to Hume's list: imaginative fluency and emotional responsiveness. I close by examining a trio of challenges to my view and supporting (...) a mitigated aesthetic nonrealism. (shrink)

We provide a semantics for relevant logics with addition of Aristotle's Thesis, ∼(A→∼A) and also Boethius,(A→B)→∼(A→∼B). We adopt the Routley-Meyer affixing style of semantics but include in the model structures a regulatory structure for all interpretations of formulae, with a view to obtaining a lessad hoc semantics than those previously given for such logics. Soundness and completeness are proved, and in the completeness proof, a new corollary to the Priming Lemma is introduced (c.f.Relevant Logics and their Rivals I, Ridgeview, 1982).

I begin by providing some background to conceptions of responsibility. I note the extent of disagreement in this area, the diverse and cross-cutting distinctions that are deployed, and the relative neglect of some important problems. These facts make it difficult to attribute responsibility for climate change, but so do some features of climate change itself which I go on to illuminate. Attributions of responsibility are often contested sites because such attributions are fundamentally pragmatic, mobilized in the service of a normative (...) outlook. We should be pluralists about responsibility and shape whatever conceptions can help to explain, guide, and motivate our responses to climate change. I sketch one such notion, ‘intervention-responsibility’, and argue that it should be ascribed to international regimes and organizations, states and other jurisdictions, individuals, and firms. Each has different capacities and thus different intervention-responsibilities responsibilities, but these differences are not always mirrored in public discussion. In particular, the moral responsibility of firms has been greatly neglected. (shrink)

This essay reflects on arguments by Paul Ramsey, in The Patient as Person: Explorations in Medical Ethics (1970) and elsewhere, that continue to challenge policy‐makers and those doing clinical and translational research involving children. Ramsey argued that parents cannot morally authorize their child's participation in research unless the research is designed to benefit the child. He acknowledged that abiding by this position could have adverse impacts on improving child health, and he concluded, in a 1976 Hastings Center Report piece, that (...) researchers must “sin bravely.” Many philosophers and theologians, including Richard McCormick, have argued against Ramsey. The Ramsey‐McCormick debate played out in the bioethics literature and, by invitation, at the deliberations of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which was tasked with developing an ethics framework and policies for human subjects protections. Although in its final recommendations, the commission sided with McCormick, the strict limitations on risks and harms to which a child can be exposed were clearly influenced by Ramsey. (shrink)

Through theoretical discussion, literature review, and a computational model, this paper poses a challenge to the notion that perspective-taking involves a fixed architecture in which particular processes have priority. For example, some research suggests that egocentric perspectives can arise more quickly, with other perspectives (such as of task partners) emerging only secondarily. This theoretical dichotomy–between fast egocentric and slow other-centric processes–is challenged here. We propose a general view of perspective-taking as an emergent phenomenon governed by the interplay among cognitive mechanisms (...) that accumulate information at different timescales. We first describe the pervasive relevance of perspective-taking to cognitive science. A dynamical systems model is then introduced that explicitly formulates the timescale interaction proposed. This model illustrates that, rather than having a rigid time course, perspective-taking can be fast or slow depending on factors such as task context. Implications are discussed, with ideas for future empirical research. (shrink)

This article is a review of Deep Postmodernism by Jerry H. Gill. In this book Gill juxtaposes and compares the philosophies of Whitehead, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Polanyi, and Austin—philosophies that on the surface are very different but, examined closely, are remarkably complementary and convergent in respect of their challenging and revising key assumptions of modern thought relating to topics of reality, linguistic meaning, embodiment, and knowing. Their critiques resonate with several of the critiques of well-known postmodern thinkers but go deeper by (...) reconstructing the key assumptions in question. I compare Gill’s conception of deep postmodern philosophy with Polanyi’s conception of post-critical philosophy. Gill’s book is significant in setting out in one place the beachhead that these five thinkers have established in overcoming the philosophically sterile dead-ends that modernist and postmodernist thought have bequeathed us. (shrink)